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Abstract
Fermé and Rott [Revision by comparison, Art. Intell. 157 (2004) 5–47] introduced a binary operation of ‘revision by comparison’
and pointed out that this method of changing epistemic states has both characteristics of belief contraction (with respect to the
‘reference sentence’) and characteristics of belief revision (with respect to the ‘input sentence’). Using revision by comparison as
a unifying framework, the present paper studies the unary limiting cases of severe withdrawal, irrevocable revision and irrefutable
revision. While variants of the ﬁrst two operations are well-known from the literature, the last one is new.
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1. Introduction: revision by comparison
Revision by comparison is a model introduced by Fermé and Rott [5, henceforth ‘F&R’] that offers a rational method
of changing beliefs in response to inputs of the form
Accept  with a degree of plausibility that at least equals that of .
Belief states are represented either by systems $ of spheres of possible worlds or by entrenchment orderings ≤ of the
sentences in a given propositional language [8–10]. An agent’s set K of beliefs can be retrieved from each of these
structures:
(Def K$), K = { :  true in every world in
⋂ $},
(Def K≤), K = { : ⊥ < }.
It can be shown that sets of sentences K thus deﬁned are closed under the Tarskian background logic Cn which we
suppose to govern the object language. Logically closed sets are also called belief sets.
If the agent in belief state $ or ≤ receives the instruction to accept  at least as ﬁrmly as , and if he conforms to it,
then he will modify his belief state, and as a result obtain a new system of spheres $′ or a new entrenchment ordering
≤′, respectively. Here is the essential construction of F&R in terms of systems of spheres:
(Def $′ from $)
$′ = ({S ∩ [] : S ∈ $ and S ⊆ []} ∪ {S : S ∈ $ and S ⊆ []}) − {∅}
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for  and  such that not
⋃ $ ⊆ [] ∩ []. In the latter case, we put $′ = {∅}. The same construction can be deﬁned in
terms of entrenchment relations:
(Def ≤′ from ≤)
 ≤′  iff
{
 ∧ ( → ) ≤ ( → ) if  ≤ ,
 ≤  otherwise.
This paper builds crucially upon the model and results presented by F&R, to which the reader is referred to for extended
explanation and motivation of the model of revision by comparison.
From $′ or respectively from ≤′, a revised belief set can be retrieved that we denote by K ◦ . One can plug together
(Def ≤′ from ≤) and (Def K≤) and deﬁne K ◦  = K≤′ , which yields, after a few simplifying steps
(Def ◦ from ≤)
 ∈ K ◦  iff
⎧⎨
⎩
¬ <  ∧ ( → ) or
 <  or
 ≤  ∧ ¬
This deﬁnes the revision-by-comparison function ◦. We skip the analogous deﬁnition of ◦ in terms of systems of
spheres.
F&R give the following sound and complete axiomatization of one-step revisions by comparison:
(C1) K ◦  = Cn(K ◦ ) (Closure).
(C2) If Cn () = Cn () and Cn () = Cn (), then K ◦  = K ◦  (Extensionality).
(C3) If  /∈ K ◦ ⊥, then K ◦ ⊥ ⊆ K ◦ ⊥ (Strong inclusion)
(C4) If  ∈ K ◦ ⊥, then  ∈ K ◦  (Irrevocability).
(C5) If  ∈ K ◦∧¬ ⊥, then K ◦  = (K ◦∧¬ ⊥) +  (Reduction 1).
(C6) If  /∈ K ◦∧¬ ⊥, then K ◦  = K ◦∧¬ ⊥ (Reduction 2).
A single additional axiom (IT) captures the operation’s behaviour in iterated applications. Unfortunately, this axiom is
complicated and unintuitive. For the present paper, we need only the following two consequences of (IT):
(IT1) (K ◦ ) ◦  = K ◦ ( ∧ ),
(IT4) (K ◦ ⊥) ◦ ⊥ =
{
(K ◦ ⊥) ∩ (K ◦ ⊥) if K ◦ ⊥ = L = K ◦ ⊥,
L otherwise.
The numbering is taken over from F&R.
Keeping ﬁxed the prior belief set K , we can say that ◦ takes two arguments, the reference sentence  and the input
sentence . F&R [5, pp. 9, 21] point out there that this method of changing one’s epistemic state has both characteristics
of belief revision (with respect to the input sentence) and characteristics of belief contraction (with respect to the
reference sentence).
In the present paper, this claim is fully substantiated. Notice ﬁrst that the axioms (C5) and (C6) effectively reduce
the binary operation ◦ to complex applications of the unary operation ◦⊥. This operation will be investigated in
the next section. Then we will consider two further special cases of revision by comparison that can be obtained by
holding ﬁxed one of the arguments of the binary operation ◦. Doing so specializes the dyadic belief change function
◦ to a monadic one in a much more direct way than (C5) and (C6) do. More precisely, we will consider the monadic
operations
K
..− =def K ◦ ⊥, Severe withdrawal,
K ∗  =def K ◦ , Irrevocable revision,
K   =def K ◦ε , Irrefutable revision.
In the last line, ε is supposed to denote a ﬁxed reference sentence that expresses a belief which is not irrevocable, where
a belief or sentence  is called irrevocable if it resists any attempt to remove it from the belief set K , or more formally,
if  ∈ K ◦ ⊥. 1
1 Alternatively,  is irrevocable iff  ∈ K ◦ ¬. F&R (conditions Q5 and Q15) show that the two conditions are equivalent. If they are satisﬁed,
then K ◦ ⊥ and K ◦ ¬ are both inconsistent. In terms of systems of spheres and entrenchments,  is irrevocable iff
⋃ $ ⊆ [] and, respectively,
 ≤ . One can also think of the set of current beliefs as being determined by a given revision-by-comparison function. For instance, the equation
K = K ◦⊥ ⊥ can serve as a suitable deﬁnition (Def K◦). See F&R (p. 19).
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It is rather surprising that the above operations turn out to be specializations of a single more general belief change
function. Intuitively, the operation of severe withdrawal is very different from the operation of irrevocable revision,
which shares a number of important properties with irrefutable revision. While variants of the ﬁrst two operations are
well-known from the literature, the last one is new.
2. Iterable severe withdrawal
Severe withdrawal is a belief change operation that removes a belief from an existing belief system, without at the
same time implanting any new beliefs into the belief system. Severe withdrawal is an alternative to the more widely
known operation of contraction introduced by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, henceforth ‘AGM’ [1]. Its name
is due to the fact that it incurs more loss of information than AGM’s contraction operation. Severe withdrawal was
studied by Rott [15, Section 5], by Levi [12,13] who calls the operation “mild contraction” and advances interesting
philosophical arguments in its favour, by Pagnucco and Rott [14], by Fermé and Rodriguez [4] who call it “Rott
contraction”, and by Arló-Costa and Levi [2].
In this section we study the unary operation ..− which is deﬁned by putting
K
..− = K ◦ ⊥
for every sentence . 2 It turns out that the resulting operation is very close to the Pagnucco and Rott’s model of severe
withdrawal.
The semantics for this operation in terms of systems of spheres is discussed in Section 2 of F&R, and turns out to be
very close to the semantics presented in [14]. The deﬁnition (Def $′ from $) for the operation ..− = ◦⊥ reduces to
$′ =
{ {S ∈ $ : S ⊆ []} if S ⊆ [] for some S ∈ $,
{∅} otherwise,
where  is the sentence to be withdrawn. 3
The revised entrenchment relation corresponding to the operation ..− can be derived from (Def ≤′ from ≤):
 ≤′  iff  ≤  or  ≤ 
Loosely speaking, the operation is one on systems of spheres or on entrenchment relations (rather than on operation on
belief sets), where “outer spheres” and, respectively, “higher entrenchments” are left untouched, and “inner spheres”
and, respectively, “lower entrenchments” collapse into one single class.
As an operation of withdrawal of beliefs from belief sets which is deﬁned in terms of entrenchments, we can take
down
(Def ..− from ≤),  ∈ K ..− iff  <  or  ≤ .
Now we give an axiomatic deﬁnition of severe withdrawals which is close to the one given by Pagnucco and Rott
[14, p. 512].
Deﬁnition 1. Let K be a belief set. A belief change function ..− on K is an operation of severe withdrawal if and only
if it satisﬁes the following postulates:
( ..−1) K ..− = Cn (K ..−) (Closure).
( ..−2) If K ..− = L, then K ..− ⊆ K (Restricted inclusion).
( ..−3) If  /∈ K , then K ⊆ K ..− (Vacuity).
( ..−4) If K ..− = L, then  /∈ K ..− (Restricted success).
2 More generally, ⊥ could be replaced by any sentence the negation of which is irrevocable.
3 F&R [5, p. 11] also consider a semantics of revision by comparison in terms of total pre-orderings of possible worlds. For severe contraction
K
..− = K ◦ ⊥, their deﬁnition (Def ′ from ) of the posterior ordering ′ of worlds reduces to
w′w′ iff
{
ww′ and w′′w′ for some ¬-world w′′ or
ww′′ for all ¬-worlds w′′.
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( ..−5) If  ∈ K ..−, then  ∈ K ..− (Irrevocability).
( ..−6) If Cn () = Cn (), then K ..− = K ..− (Extensionality).
( ..−7) If K ..− = L, then K ..− ⊆ K ..−( ∧ ) (Antitony).
( ..−8) If  /∈ K ..−( ∧ ), then K ..−( ∧ ) ⊆ K ..− (Conjunctive inclusion).
Half of these conditions, viz. ( ..−1), ( ..−3), ( ..−6) and ( ..−8), are well-known from the AGM belief contractions [1,8].
( ..−2) and ( ..−4) have new preconditions as compared with AGM. Condition ( ..−5) is new. We need it because we allow
for the possibility that a withdrawal of a non-tautology fails. Notice that our condition ( ..−5) has got nothing to do
with the ﬁfth AGM postulate which is commonly called ‘recovery’. Recovery is a very controversial property, and it is
invalid for severe withdrawal functions.
Finally, the Antitony Condition ( ..−7) is new, too. It is much stronger than the seventh AGM condition. Both ( ..−7)
and the AGM condition ( ..−8) depend crucially on the axiom (C3) for revision by comparison. The following conditions
are specializations of the conditions (K .−8+) and (K .−D) from F&R [5, p. 20]. They follow from the above axioms for
severe withdrawals (the proofs of this claim and all other proofs are deferred to the appendix).
( ..−8+) If  /∈ K ..−( ∧ ) then K ..−( ∧ ) = K ..−,
( ..−D) K ..−( ∧ ) = K ..− or K ..−( ∧ ) = K ..−.
There are three differences between severe withdrawal deﬁned as revision by comparison with input sentence ⊥ and
severe withdrawal in the sense of [14]. In the Pagnucco–Rott model, we have that K ..− = K for  ∈ Cn (∅). In the
approach developed in this paper, we get K ..− = L in this case. Secondly, according to Deﬁnition 1, K ◦ ⊥ = L
is possible even for an  such that  /∈ Cn (∅), since there may be non-tautological sentences  that are irrevocable in
the sense that  ∈ K ..−. For Pagnucco and Rott, only tautologies are irrevocable. For this reason, we now have the
condition K ..− = L in the axiomatization, wherever Pagnucco and Rott have the condition  /∈ Cn (∅). The restricting
clause in the success condition ( ..−2) is new.
There is a third, more fundamental difference. We will now add a condition for iterated severe withdrawal. This has
not been done in the literature before, but the relevant idea is very straightforward. The one-step operation of severe
withdrawal collapses the innermost rings of a system of spheres, or respectively, the lowest levels of entrenchment—and
this is all the change that is being effected. Accordingly, we can say that a function ..− on K is an operation of iterable
severe withdrawal if and only if it satisﬁes ( ..−1) – ( ..−8) and
( ..− it) (K ..−) ..− =
{
(K
..−) ∩ (K ..−) if K ..− = L = K ..−,
L otherwise.
The notation (K ..−) ..− is used here for iterated belief withdrawal. One may think of this as slightly misleading since
considered as an operation on a belief set, the second occurrence of ..− does not denote “the same” contraction function
as the ﬁrst ..− . But our notation should not conceal the fact that revision by comparison operates on belief states (systems
of spheres or entrenchment relations) in the ﬁrst place, and only in a derived sense on belief sets. Belief sets result only
after applying (Def K$) or (Def K≤), respectively. 4
It is evident how ( ..− it) can be used to construct any ﬁnite number of applications of severe withdrawal.
Taken together with the axioms for one-step severe withdrawal, ( ..− it) characterizes exactly the withdrawal functions
deﬁned through revision by comparison with input sentence ⊥.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Let ◦ be a revision-by-comparison operator on a belief set K that satisﬁes (C1) – (C6), and
let ..− be deﬁned by putting K ..− = K ◦ ⊥ for all sentences . Then ..− is a severe withdrawal operator satisfying
( ..−1) – ( ..−8). If ◦ in addition satisﬁes (IT), then ..− satisﬁes ( ..− it).
4 Another way of thinking about the matter is to insist that ..− is not a two-place function, taking ordered pairs as arguments with a belief set
and a sentence as components, but a one-place function associated with one and the same initial belief set K . So (K ..−) ..−, for instance, is really
a contraction of this initial belief set K through a sequence of inputs 〈, 〉. For a detailed discussion of the conceptual problems besetting the
representation of iterated belief changes, see [17].
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Theorem 2 (Completeness). Let K be a belief set and ..− a severe withdrawal function on K that satisﬁes ( ..−1) – ( ..−8)
and ( ..− it). Then there is an entrenchment relation ≤ such that for all , K ..− = K ◦ ⊥, where ◦ is deﬁned by (Def ◦
from ≤), and moreover, for all  and , (K ..−) ..− = (K ◦ ⊥) ◦ ⊥, where ◦ is deﬁned by (Def ≤′ from ≤) and (Def
◦ from ≤).
3. Irrevocable belief revision
In contrast to severe withdrawal, irrevocable belief revision is an operation that has right from the beginning been
invented for use in repeated belief revisions. Irrevocable revision is close in spirit to the non-repeatable revision
operations introduced by Alchourrón et al. [1] because such revisions are always successful in the sense that the input
sentence always gets accepted, but its results are not always consistent. In AGM, a repeatedly revised belief set is
inconsistent if and only if the last input sentence is itself inconsistent. In irrevocable belief change, the revised belief
set is inconsistent if and only if the conjunction of the sequence of input sentences is inconsistent. The operation of
irrevocable revision was studied by Rott [15, Section 6], Friedman and Halpern [6,7], Segerberg [18] and Fermé [3].
In this section we study the unary operation ∗ which is deﬁned by putting
K ∗  = K ◦ 
for every sentence . 5
It turns out that the resulting operation is very close to irrevocable revision as deﬁned in the literature. This is why
we appropriate the name for our purposes.
The semantics for this operation in terms of systems of spheres is deﬁned as a special case of deﬁnition (Def $′ from $)
which reduces to
$′ =
{ {S ∩ [] : S ∈ $} − {∅} if S ∩ [] = ∅ for some S ∈ $,
{∅} otherwise,
where  is the sentence to be accepted. 6
The revised entrenchment relation corresponding to the operation ‘∗’ deﬁned above can be derived from (Def ≤′
from ≤):
 ≤′  iff  →  ≤  → .
After irrevocable revisions by , the ¬-worlds become completely disregarded, or equivalently, sentences will always
be compared in terms of their entrenchment conditional on .
As an operation of revision of belief sets by new input sentences which is deﬁned in terms of entrenchments, we
take down
(Def ∗ from ≤),  ∈ K ∗  iff ¬ <  →  or  ≤ ¬.
Now we give an axiomatic deﬁnition of irrevocable revision which is similar to the ones given in [18,3], with a few
additional elements from [16]. Both Segerberg’s and Fermé’s axiomatizations make use of an explicit representation
of the set of irrevocable sentences, which is used to specify a consistency condition for ∗. Starting from revision by
comparison, however, we can work with a much simpler format which leaves the set of irrevocable sentences implicit.
5 More generally,  could be replaced by any irrevocable sentence.
6 As regards the irrevocable revision semantics in terms of total pre-orderings of worlds (cf. footnote 3), F&R’s deﬁnition (Def′ from) of the
posterior ordering ′ of worlds reduces to
w′w′ iff
{
ww′ and w and w′ are both -worlds or,
w′ is a ¬-world.
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Deﬁnition 2. Let K be a belief set. A belief change function ∗ on K is an operation of irrevocable belief revision if
and only if ∗ satisﬁes:
(∗1) K ∗  = Cn (K ∗ ) (Closure).
(∗2)  ∈ K ∗  (Success).
(∗3) K ∗  ⊆ K +  (Inclusion).
(∗4) If ¬ /∈ K , then K ⊆ K ∗  (Preservation).
(∗5) If  ∈ K ∗ ¬, then  ∈ K ∗  (Irrevocability).
(∗6) If Cn () = Cn (), then K ∗  = K ∗  (Extensionality).
(∗7) K ∗ ( ∧ ) ⊆ (K ∗ ) +  (Superexpansion).
(∗8) If ¬ /∈ K ∗ , then K ∗  ⊆ K ∗ ( ∧ ) (Conjunctive preservation).
A function ∗ on K is an operation of iterable irrevocable revision if and only if it satisﬁes (∗1) – (∗8) and
(∗it) (K ∗ ) ∗  = K ∗ ( ∧ ).
Conditions (∗1) – (∗8) are very close to AGM’s postulates for belief revision. Conditions (∗4) and (∗8) are slightly
weakened as compared to AGM’s postulates with the same label, but are equivalent given (∗1) and (∗2). The remaining
change is that AGM’s ﬁfth postulate called ‘consistency preservation’ is not there any more. We want to make room
for the possibility that the revision by a non-contradiction can make the agent’s beliefs collapse into L, and condition
(∗5) expresses that such non-contradictions are the negations of irrevocable sentences (where irrevocability now means
 ∈ K ∗ ¬). In fact, any revision by the negation of an irrevocable sentence will lead to an epistemic collapse, due to
(∗2). Our condition (∗5) is effectively weaker than AGM’s Consistency preservation which is invalid for irrevocable
revision functions. But it is worth keeping in mind that the above axiomatization includes all the other AGM postulates
for belief revision.
In AGM revision, the problem of the epistemic collapse always arises if the negation of the input sentence is
irrevocable (which in the particular case of AGM means that the input sentence is a contradiction). In revision by
comparison, it arises only in the rather peculiar case where both the reference sentence and the negation of the input
sentence are irrevocable. If only the latter condition is satisﬁed, then we obtain a special kind of belief withdrawal
function: Severe withdrawal.
As in AGM theory, we can equivalently use the following condition instead of the pair (∗7) and (∗8): 7
(∗7&8) Either K ∗ ( ∨ ) = K ∗  or K ∗ ( ∨ ) = K ∗ 
or K ∗ ( ∨ ) = K ∗  ∩ K ∗  (Disjunctive factoring).
In condition (∗it), we use the notation (K ∗)∗ for iterated belief change. One may think of this as slightly misleading
since considered as an operation on a belief set, the second occurrence of ∗ does not denote “the same” revision function
as the ﬁrst ∗. But the reply is the same as in the case of severe withdrawal. Revision by comparison operates on belief
states in the ﬁrst place, and only secondarily on belief sets. It is evident how (∗it) can be used to construct any ﬁnite
number of applications of irrevocable revision. By (∗2) and (∗it), it is clear that once a belief set K gets revised by ,
the sentence  is never going to be lost under irrevocable revisions any more, and thus assumes an irrevocable status in
the posterior belief set.
The axiom set listed in Deﬁnition 2 characterizes exactly the revision functions deﬁned through revision by com-
parison with reference sentence .
Theorem 3 (Soundness). Let ◦ be a revision-by-comparison operator on a belief set K that satisﬁes (C1) – (C6), and
let ∗ be deﬁned by putting K ∗  = K ◦  for all sentences . Then ∗ is an irrevocable revision operator satisfying
(∗1) – (∗8). If ◦ in addition satisﬁes (IT), then ∗ satisﬁes (∗it).
Theorem 4 (Completeness). Let K be a belief set and ∗ an irrevocable revision function on K that satisﬁes (∗1) –
(∗8) and (∗it). Then there is an entrenchment relation ≤ such that for all , K ∗  = K ◦ , where ◦ is deﬁned by
7 See property (K∗7&8) of F&R.
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(Def ◦ from ≤), and moreover, for all  and , (K ∗ ) ∗  = (K ◦ ) ◦ , where ◦ is deﬁned by (Def ≤′ from ≤)
and (Def ◦ from ≤).
4. Irrefutable belief revision
Like irrevocable revision, irrefutable belief revision is an operation that is designed to deal with repeated belief
revision operations. It is different in spirit from the non-repeatable revision operations introduced by Alchourrón,
Gärdenfors and Makinson: irrefutable revisions are always consistent (the resulting belief set is always free of con-
tradictions) but not always successful (the input sentence is not always accepted). The success condition of AGM
is weakened in irrefutable belief revision, in order to pay unrestricted respect to the requirement of consistency. For
instance, while AGM require ⊥ to be included in K ∗⊥, irrefutable belief revision models agents as being less gullible
and refusing to accept any inconsistencies.
In irrevocable belief change,  is invariably accepted in K ∗ , and it can never be lost in subsequent belief changes
through revision by comparison (whence the name). In irrefutable belief change,  is not necessarily accepted in K .
The revised belief set K  is invariably consistent even though sometimes ¬ is retained. However, if ¬ is eliminated
in K  , then ¬ will never be regained in any subsequent belief change through further applications of irrefutable
revision. In this sense,  will never be refuted again (whence the name).
In this section we study the unary operation  which is deﬁned by putting
K   = K ◦ε 
for every sentence . Here ε is supposed to be a ﬁxed reference sentence inK which is not irrevocable, that is, ε /∈ K◦ε⊥.
This latter requirement is precisely what distinguishes irrefutable from irrevocable belief revision. As far as I know,
this operation has not been studied in the literature before.
An intended application of belief revision with a ﬁxed reference sentence is the case where all incoming information
stems from the same source and the source’s credibility is understood to be speciﬁed by the ﬁxed reference sentence.
Sources should better be reliable, however. It is a weakness of irrefutable belief change that once a revision fails to be
successful (i.e.,  /∈ K  ), the agent is caught in a belief set from which he can never escape by further irrefutable
revisions. It will turn out that K  ⊥, though consistent, is this strange attractor. That belief set can be left only if the
agent decides to raise the standard set by the reference sentence, or else to change his revision method.
We thus assume as given (and ﬁxed) a parameter sentence ε such that ε /∈ K ◦ε ⊥. In terms of entrenchment, the
condition on ε means that ε < . Notice that if ε is not irrevocable before the revision, then it is not made irrevocable by
application of the revision operation ◦ε either. This is guaranteed by (IT1) which implies that (K ◦ε ) ◦ε ⊥ = K ◦ε ⊥.
If ε is not contained in K , then K ◦ε  = K (by the vacuity property of ◦ mentioned in F&R, Lemma 5), that is,
K   = K for any arbitrary sentence .
The system of spheres and entrenchment semantics for this revision operation are given by the general forms of (Def
$′ from $) and (Def ≤′ from ≤) respectively, as given in Section 1. This time there is no way to reduce these deﬁnitions.
Now we introduce a set of properties characterizing the monadic revision functions that we want to call irrefutable
from now on.
Deﬁnition 3. Let K be a consistent belief set. A belief change function  on K is an operation of irrefutable belief
revision if and only if  satisﬁes:
(1) K   = Cn (K  ) (Closure).
(2c) If K   = K  ⊥, then  ∈ K   (Conditional success).
(3) K   ⊆ K +  (Inclusion).
(4) If ¬ /∈ K , then K ⊆ K   (Preservation).
(5u) K   = L (Unconditional consistency).
(6) If Cn() = Cn(), then K   = K   (Extensionality).
(7) K  ( ∧ ) ⊆ (K  ) +  (Superexpansion).
(8) If ¬ /∈ K  , then K   ⊆ K  ( ∧ ) (Conjunctive preservation).
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(9) If K  ⊥ = K , then K   = K (Vacuity).
(10) If K  ⊥ = K , then K  ⊥ 
⋂
{K   :  ∈ K  } (Fallback).
An function  on K is an operation of iterable irrefutable revision if and only if  satisﬁes (1), (2c), (3), (4), (5u),
(6) – (10) and
( it) (K  )   = K  ( ∧ ).
This axiomatization for  includes versions of all the AGM postulates, but it weakens AGM’s unconditional Success
postulate (∗2) to theConditional success postulate (2c), and it strengthensAGM’s conditionalConsistency preservation
postulate (which has the antecedent ¬ /∈ Cn (∅)) to the unconditional (5u). In ordinary AGM revision, inconsistent
input leads the agent into the inconsistent belief set L. In irrefutable belief change, in contrast, inconsistent input
leads to a special fallback theory K  ⊥ which normally is a rather weak (and in any case consistent) belief set. Our
characterization includes two additional axioms concerning this fallback theory. (9) states that if a revision by a
contradiction does not affect the prior belief set, then no revision whatsoever does. This case applies if and only if
ε /∈ K (by ( ..−2) – ( ..−4), remembering that K ⊥ = K ..−ε). On the other hand, (10) makes clear that K ⊥ represents
a state of serious puzzlement: if this fallback position does differ from the original belief set K , then it contains less
information than any successful revision; it even loses sentences that are contained in all successful revisions.
In condition (it), we use the notation (K ) for iterated belief change. This presents the same notational problem
as in the case of severe withdrawal and irrevocable revision, from which no confusion should arise by now.
The following lemma lists two useful facts concerning irrefutable revision:
Lemma 5. Let  satisfy (1), (2c), (3) – (4), (5u) and (6) – (10).
(i) If  ∈ K   and   then  ∈ K   (Strict improvement 8).
(ii) K  ⊥ ⊆ K   (Fallback inclusion).
In Lemma 5, condition (i) says that if a revision by  is successful, then any revision by a weaker sentence is also
successful. Condition (ii) says that the fallback theory is a subset of any irrefutable revision of K , whether successful
or not.
Theorem 6 (Soundness). LetK be a consistent belief set, let ◦ be a revision-by-comparison operator onK that satisﬁes
(C1) – (C6), and let ε be such that ε /∈ K ◦ε ⊥. Deﬁne  by putting K   = K ◦ε  for all sentences . Then  is an
irrefutable belief revision function satisfying (1), (2c), (3) – (4), (5u) and (6) – (10). If ◦ in addition satisﬁes
(IT), then  satisﬁes (it).
Theorem 7 (Completeness). Let K be a consistent belief set and  an irrefutable revision function on K that satisﬁes
(1), (2c), (3) – (4), (5u) and (6) – (10). Then there is an entrenchment relation ≤ and a sentence ε such that for
all , K   = K ◦ε , where ◦ is deﬁned by (Def ◦ from ≤), and moreover, for all  and , (K  )   = (K ◦ε ) ◦ε ,
where ◦ is deﬁned by (Def ≤′ from ≤) and (Def ◦ from ≤).
Irrefutable belief revision is close in spirit to credibility-limited belief revision, or more precisely, to sphere-based
and entrenchment-based credibility limited revision in the sense of Hansson et al. [11]. Both models put a very strong
emphasis on the consistency of revised belief sets, and in exchange for this, they do not place their trust in unconditional
“success” (∗2). They achieve this by providing for the possibility that the agent refuses to accept certain “incredible”
input sentences. Irrefutable and credibility-limited revision differ only in the case where the agent is confronted with
an incredible input sentence . The case in point here arises when all spheres of possible worlds that are covered by [ε]
are also covered by [¬], or equivalently in terms of entrenchment, when ε ≤ ¬. In this case credibility-limited belief
8 Compare Hansson et al. [11, p. 1582].
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revision recommends that the agent does nothing (keeps the same belief set K 9 ), whereas irrevocable belief revision
leads the subject into a state of great ignorance, into the belief set K  ⊥.
5. Conclusion
We have seen that by some special ﬁxations of input or reference sentences, the binary operation of revision by
comparison can be reduced to three of interesting unary operations for iterated belief change. Using revision by
comparison as a unifying framework, we uncovered a common superstructure of severe withdrawal and irrevocable
revision—twowell-known operations that have not been thought of as in anyway related so far. Revision by comparison
has also helped us to design irrefutable revision, a new variant of belief revision that values the consistency of belief
sets higher than the unconditional acceptance of the input sentence. The axiomatization of revision by comparison
served as a convenient means for setting up streamlined axiomatizations of the three unary operations mentioned.
However, the cautionary remark on revision by comparison at the end of Fermé and Rott [5, p. 27] also applies to the
unary limiting cases: The operations in question tend to make belief states (i.e., systems of spheres or entrenchment
relations) coarser and coarser along a series of repeated belief changes of these types, and the reasoner may ﬁnd
himself ending up in a belief state that is not going to be changed any more by any operation of revision by comparison.
Therefore the operations studied in the present paper have to be combined with other methods—preferably methods
that tend to reﬁne belief states—in order to serve as a practical and realistic model of the dynamics of epistemic states.
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Appendix A. Proofs
The following proofs make free use not only of the conditions (C1) – (C6) and (IT1) and (IT4) mentioned in Section
1, but also of the following derived properties that were motivated and proved to hold for revision by comparison in
Fermé and Rott [5, pp. 19–21, 28].
Lem. 0(d) If  ∈ K ◦ ⊥, then K ◦ ⊥ = K⊥.
(Vacuity) If  /∈ K , then K ◦  = K .
(Q2)  ∈ K ◦ ¬ iff  ∈ K ◦ ¬.
(Q16) If  /∈ K ◦ ⊥, then K ◦ ⊥ ⊆ K ◦∧ ⊥.
(Q17) If  /∈ K ◦ ⊥, then K ◦ ⊥ ⊆ K ◦ 
(K∗2) If  ∈ K ◦ , then  ∈ K ◦  (Weak success).
(K∗3) K ◦  ⊆ K +  (Inclusion).
(K∗4) If ¬ /∈ K , then K ⊆ K ◦  (Preservation).
(K∗5)  ∧ ¬ ∈ K ◦∧¬ ⊥ iff K ◦  = K⊥ (Consistency).
(K∗7) K ◦ ( ∧ ) ⊆ (K ◦ ) +  (Superexpansion).
(K∗8) If ¬ /∈ K ◦ , then K ◦  ⊆ K ◦ ( ∧ ) (Conj. preservation).
We also need the following properties of entrenchment relations (Gärdenfors and Makinson [9]):
(E1) If  ≤  and  ≤ , then  ≤  (Transitivity).
(E2) If , then  ≤  (Dominance).
(E3)  ≤  ∧  or  ≤  ∧  (Conjunctiveness).
9 Or, potentially, that he keeps the same system of spheres $ or the same entrenchment relation ≤. But notice that irrevocable belief change is in
itself suitable for iteration, while credibility-limited belief change is not.
H. Rott / Theoretical Computer Science 355 (2006) 228–242 237
Proof of ( ..−8+) and ( ..−D) from the axioms for severe withdrawal. ( ..−8+) Let  /∈ K ..−( ∧ ). Then K ..−( ∧
) ⊆ K ..− is immediate from ( ..−8). On the other hand, we can conclude from  /∈ K ..−(∧ ) with the help of ( ..−5)
that K ..− = L. So K ..− ⊆ K ..−( ∧ ) by ( ..−7), which gives us the desired identity.
( ..−D) Suppose that notK ..−(∧) = K ..−.We need to show that in this caseK ..−(∧) = K ..−. From the hypothesis
we know that either K ..−( ∧ ) ⊆ K ..− or K ..− ⊆ K ..−( ∧ ). By ( ..−7) and ( ..−8), either  ∈ K ..−( ∧ ) or
K
..− = L. By ( ..−5), we get in any case that  ∈ K ..−(∧). Suppose ﬁrst that  ∈ K ..−(∧) as well. Then we have
∧  ∈ K ..−(∧ ), whence K ..−(∧ ) = L = K ..−, by ( ..−4) and ( ..−5). Suppose, secondly, that  /∈ K ..−(∧ ).
Then K ..−( ∧ ) = K ..−, by ( ..−8+), and we are done. 
Proof of Theorem 1 (Soundness of severe withdrawal).
( ..−1) follows from (C1).
( ..−2) Let K ◦ ⊥ = L. Then by Lemma 0(d) of part I of this paper,  /∈ K ◦ ⊥, so by applying (Q16), (K∗3) and (C1)
we get that K ◦ ⊥ ⊆ K ◦  ⊆ K +  = K .
( ..−3) follows from Vacuity.
( ..−4) is Lemma 0(d) of part I of this paper.
( ..−5) follows from (C4).
( ..−6) follows from (C2).
( ..−7) Let K ◦ ⊥ = L. Then by Lemma 0(d) of part I of this paper,  /∈ K ◦ ⊥. By (C1),  ∧  /∈ K ◦ ⊥. So by
(C3), K ◦ ⊥ ⊆ K ◦∧ ⊥.
( ..−8) Let  /∈ K ◦∧ ⊥. Then by (C3), K ◦∧ ⊥ ⊆ K ◦ ⊥, as desired.
( ..− it) follows from (IT4). 
Proof of Theorem 2 (Completeness of severe withdrawal). We use (Def ..− from ≤) which is a special case of (Def
◦ from ≤), and as its “converse”
(Def ≤ from ..− )  ≤  iff  /∈ K ..− or  ∈ K ..−
which is just a rewriting of (Def ≤ from ◦) of Fermé and Rott [5]. First we show that (Def ≤ from ..− ) deﬁnes an
entrenchment relation ≤ that satisﬁes (E1) – (E3).
As a preparation, we prove that
(†) If  /∈ K ..−, then  /∈ K ..−( ∧ )
Weshow the contraposition. Suppose that  ∈ K ..−(∧). Then by ( ..−1), either ∧ ∈ K ..−(∧) or /∈ K ..−(∧).
In the former case, we get from ( ..−5) that  ∧  ∈ K ..− and thus, by ( ..−1), that  ∈ K ..−. In the latter case, we get
from ( ..−8) that K ..−( ∧ ) ⊆ K ..−. Since  ∈ K ..−( ∧ ), we get  ∈ K ..− as well. This proves (†).
≤ satisﬁes (E1): Let  ≤  and  ≤ , i.e., by (Def ≤ from ..− ), ( /∈ K ..− or  ∈ K ..−) and ( /∈ K ..− or
 ∈ K ..−). We want to show that  ≤ . i.e., that ( /∈ K ..− or  ∈ K ..−).
If  ∈ K ..−, then we are done. Suppose that  /∈ K ..−. Thus  /∈ K ..−. By ( ..−5),  /∈ K ..−. Thus  /∈ K ..−. From
 /∈ K ..−, we get by (†) that  /∈ K ..−( ∧ ), which implies, by ( ..−8), K ..−( ∧ ) ⊆ K ..−. Hence  /∈ K ..−( ∧ ).
From  /∈ K ..−, on the other hand, we get that K ..− = L and thus, by ( ..−7), K ..− ⊆ K ..−( ∧ ). Hence  /∈ K ..−.
This proves (E1).
≤ satisﬁes (E2): Let   . We want to show that  ≤ , that is, by (Def ≤ from ..− ),  /∈ K ..− or  ∈ K ..−. Suppose
that  ∈ K ..−. Then, by ( ..−1), we get  ∈ K ..−, and we are done.
≤ satisﬁes (E3): We want to show that either  ≤ ( ∧ ) or  ≤ ( ∧ ), that is, by (Def ≤ from ..− ), either
( /∈ K ..−( ∧ ) or  ∧  ∈ K ..−( ∧ )) or ( /∈ K ..−( ∧ ) or  ∧  ∈ K ..−( ∧ )). But this follows immediately
from ( ..−1).
Second, we show that ..− is identical with the operation ..−′ = ◦...⊥ deﬁned from ..− by successive application of
(Def ≤ from ..− ) and (Def ..− from ≤).
 ∈ K ..−′ iff (by Def ..− from ≤)
 <  or  ≤  iff (by Def ≤ from ..− )
( ∈ K ..− and  /∈ K ..−) or ( /∈ K ..− or  ∈ K ..−) iff (by ..−1)
 ∈ K ..− or  ∈ K ..−.
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That  ∈ K ..− implies  ∈ K ..−′ is obvious.
For the converse, suppose that  ∈ K ..−′. Then either  ∈ K ..− straight away, or  ∈ K ..−. But in the latter case,
by ( ..−4), K ..− = L, and so  ∈ K ..−, too.
Hence, K ..− = K ..−′, for arbitrary .
Third, a comparative inspection of ( ..− it) and (IT4) shows that (K ..−) ..− = (K ◦ ⊥) ◦ ⊥ for all  and . 
Proof of Theorem 3 (Soundness of irrevocable revision).
(∗1) follows from (C1).
(∗2) follows from (C1) and (K∗2).
(∗3) follows from (K∗3).
(∗4) follows from (K∗4).
(∗5) Let  ∈ K ◦ ¬. Then by (Q2),  ∈ K ◦ ¬ = K ◦ ⊥. So by (C4),  ∈ K ◦ .
(∗6) follows from (C2).
(∗7) follows from (K∗7).
(∗8) follows from (K∗8).
(∗it) follows from (IT1). 
Proof of Theorem 4 (Completeness of irrevocable revision). We use (Def ∗ from ≤) which is a special case of (Def
◦ from ≤), and as its “converse”
(Def ≤ from ∗)  ≤  iff  /∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ) or  ∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ )
Observation 7(e) of Fermé and Rott [5] shows that this condition is equivalent with (Def ≤ from ◦).
First we show that (Def ≤ from ∗) deﬁnes an entrenchment relation ≤ that satisﬁes (E1) – (E3).
≤ satisﬁes (E1): Let  ≤  and  ≤ , i.e., by (Def ≤ from ∗), ( /∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ) or ,  ∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ))
and ( /∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ) or ,  ∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ )). We want to show that  ≤ . i.e., that  /∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ) or  ∈ K ∗ ¬
( ∧ ).
Suppose for reductio that this is not true, i.e. that  ∈ K ∗ ¬(∧ ) and  /∈ K ∗ ¬(∧ ). If ∧  ∈ K ∗ ¬(∧ ),
then by (∗5) and (∗1)  ∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ), and we are done. So suppose that  /∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ). Then, by (∗5) and (∗1),
 ∧  /∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ). So by hypothesis  /∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ).
Now we show that
(†) If  ∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ), then  ∈ K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬).
Let  ∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ) =(by ∗ 6) K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬) ∧ (¬ ∨ ¬). Then by (∗7) and (∗1) (¬ ∨ ¬) →  ∈
K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬), and by (∗1) again,  ∈ K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬).
On the other hand, we can prove that
(‡) If  /∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ), then either  ∧  ∧ ¬ ∈ K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬) or  /∈ K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬).
Let  /∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ). By (∗6), this is equivalent with  /∈ K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬) ∧ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ). Then, by (∗8),
either ¬(¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ) ∈ K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬) or  /∈ K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬). So (‡) follows by (∗1).
Now the situation is that we have both  ∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ) and  /∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ). So we can apply both (†) and (‡).
Taking together the consequences of both, we ﬁnd that  ∧  ∧ ¬ ∈ K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬).
Next, we take the fact that  /∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ) and apply exactly the same reasoning as we have in (‡), obtaining
the conclusion that either ¬ ∧  ∧  ∈ K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬) or  /∈ K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬). But we also know
that  ∧  ∧ ¬ ∈ K ∗ (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬). Using (∗1), we ﬁnally ﬁnd that our assumptions lead us to conclude that
∧∧ ∈ K ∗(¬∨¬∨¬). By (∗5) and (∗1), this ﬁnally implies that ∧∧ ∈ K ∗¬(∧) and  ∈ K ∗¬(∧),
and we have a contradiction. This proves (E1).
≤ satisﬁes (E2): Let  .Wewant to show that  ≤ , that is, by (Def≤ from ∗),  /∈ K∗¬(∧) or ∈ K∗¬(∧).
Suppose that  ∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ). Then, by (∗1), we get  ∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ), and we are done.
≤ satisﬁes (E3): We want to show that either  ≤ ( ∧ ) or  ≤ ( ∧ ), that is, by (Def ≤ from ∗), either
( /∈ K ∗¬(∧∧) or ∧ ∈ K ∗¬(∧∧)) or ( /∈ K ∗¬(∧∧) or ∧ ∈ K ∗¬(∧∧)). Using (∗6),
H. Rott / Theoretical Computer Science 355 (2006) 228–242 239
this can be simpliﬁed to  /∈ K ∗¬(∧ ) or  /∈ K ∗¬(∧ ) or ∧  ∈ K ∗¬(∧ ). But this follows immediately
from (∗1).
Second, we show that ∗ is identical with the operation ∗′ = ◦ . . . deﬁned from ∗ by the successive application of
(Def ≤ from ∗) and (Def ∗ from ≤).
 ∈ K ∗′  iff (by Def ∗ from ≤)
¬ <  →  or  ≤ ¬ iff (by Def ≤ from ∗)
( →  ∈ K ∗ ¬(¬ ∧ ( → )) and ¬ /∈ K ∗ ¬(¬ ∧ ( → )))
or ( /∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ¬) or ¬ ∈ K ∗ ¬( ∧ ¬) iff (by ∗1 and ∗6)
 →  ∈ K ∗  or ¬ ∈ K ∗  iff (by ∗1)
 →  ∈ K ∗  iff (by ∗1 and ∗2)
 ∈ K ∗ .
Hence, K ∗′  = K ∗ , for arbitrary .
Third, a comparative inspection of (∗it) and (IT1) shows that (K ∗ ) ∗  = (K ◦ ) ◦  for all  and . 
Proof of Lemma 5. (i) If  ∈ K   and   , then by (6) and (7),  ∈ K  ( ∧ ( ∨ ¬)) ⊆ (K  ) + ( ∨ ¬),
so by propositional logic, ( ∨ ¬) →  is in K  , and thus, by (1),  is in K  .
(ii) K  ⊥ ⊆ K   follows by (9), if K  ⊥ = K; by (10), if K  ⊥ = K and  ∈ K  ; and by (2c), if  /∈
K  . 
Proof of Theorem 6 (Soundness of irrefutable revision). Let K   be deﬁned as K ◦ε  for some ﬁxed ε such that
ε /∈ K ◦ε ⊥.
(1) follows from (C1).
(2c) Let K ◦ε  = K ◦ε ⊥. We want to show that  ∈ K ◦ε . By the choice of ε, we have ε /∈ K ◦ε ⊥. Hence by
(C1), ε ∧ ¬ /∈ K ◦ε ⊥, and so, by (C3), K ◦ε ⊥ ⊆ K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥. Next, we show that ε ∈ K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥. Suppose that this
was not the case. Then by (C6), K ◦ε  = K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥. Thus, since K ◦ε  = K ◦ε ⊥, we get K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥ = K ◦ε ⊥.
Because K ◦ε ⊥ ⊆ K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥, the converse cannot hold. Thus, by (C3), ε ∈ K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥ which is what we set out
to show. We conclude with (C5) that K ◦ε  = (K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥) + , and thus ε ∈ K ◦ε , so by (K∗2),  ∈ K ◦ε , as
desired.
(3) follows from (K∗3).
(4) follows from (K∗4).
(5u) Suppose for reductio that K ◦ε  = L. Then by (K∗5), ε ∧ ¬ ∈ K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥. By (C4), ε ∧ ¬ ∈ K ◦ε ⊥, so by
(C1), ε ∈ K ◦ε ⊥, contradicting the choice of ε.
(6) follows from (C2).
(7) follows from (K∗7).
(8) follows from (K∗8).
(9) Let K  ⊥ = K ◦ε ⊥ = K ◦⊥ ⊥ = K . By the choice of ε, we know that ε /∈ K ◦ε ⊥. So ε /∈ K ◦⊥ ⊥. So by
Vacuity for ◦, K   = K ◦ε  = K for all .
(10) First, we note that since by hypothesis ε /∈ K ◦ε ⊥, (Q17) tells us that K ◦ε ⊥ ⊆ K ◦ε  for every . Thus
K  ⊥ ⊆ K   for every .
Secondly, we show that if K  ⊥ = K , then⋂ {K   :  ∈ K  } is a proper superset of K  ⊥ by showing that ε
itself is in the former, but not in the latter set. By the choice of ε, we have ε /∈ K ◦ε ⊥ = K  ⊥. So it remains to show
that ε is in every successful revision, provided that K  ⊥ = K .
Let K  ⊥ = K . Then by Vacuity, ε ∈ K = K ◦⊥ ⊥.
Let  ∈ K   = K ◦ε . We want to show that ε ∈ K   = K ◦ε .
By (C5) and (C6) we have
either (case 1) ε ∈ K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥ and K ◦ε  = (K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥) + 
or (case 2) ε /∈ K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥ and K ◦ε  = K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥.
If case 1 obtains, we get that ε ∈ (K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥) +  = K ◦ε  = K  , as desired.
We now show that because  ∈ K ◦ε , case 2 is actually impossible. From ε /∈ K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥, we get by (C1) that
⊥ /∈ K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥, so by (C3), K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥ ⊆ K ◦⊥ ⊥. So since  ∈ K ◦ε  = K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥, we conclude that  ∈ K ◦⊥ ⊥.
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By (C1), ε /∈ K ◦ε ⊥ implies that ⊥ /∈ K ◦ε ⊥, so ⊥ /∈ K ◦⊥ ⊥, by (C4). By (C1) again, we get from  ∈ K ◦⊥ ⊥ and
⊥ /∈ K ◦⊥ ⊥ that ε ∧ ¬ /∈ K ◦⊥ ⊥. So by Vacuity, K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥ = K ◦⊥ ⊥. But in case 2 we have ε /∈ K ◦ε∧¬ ⊥. On
the other hand, we have already shown from K  ⊥ = K that ε ∈ K ◦⊥ ⊥. This gives us a contradiction, so we see
that case 2 is impossible.
This proves that  ∈ K   entails ε ∈ K  , and hence that ε ∈⋂ {K   :  ∈ K  }.
Putting everything together, we ﬁnally obtain that K  ⊥  ⋂ {K   :  ∈ K  }, as desired.
(it) follows from (IT1). 
Proof of Theorem 7 (Completeness of irrefutable revision). Let K be a consistent theory, and let  satisfy (1), (2c),
(3), (4), (5u) and (6) – (10).
In the ﬁrst step we retrieve an entrenchment relation from  by means of the following deﬁnition, which is similar
to, but not identical with, the one used for the completeness proof for irrevocable revision:
 ≤  iff  /∈ K  ¬( ∧ ) or  ∈ K  ⊥.
First we show that this relation ≤ has all the properties of an entrenchment relation.
For (E1), suppose that  ≤  and  ≤ . This means that
( /∈ K  ¬( ∧ ) or  ∈ K  ⊥) and ( /∈ K  ¬( ∧ ) or  ∈ K  ⊥).
We want to show that  ≤ , i.e., that
 /∈ K  ¬( ∧ ) or  ∈ K  ⊥.
Suppose that  /∈ K  ⊥. Then we have
(I)  /∈ K  ¬( ∧ ).
By Lemma 5(ii), we get that  /∈ K  ⊥, and hence we also get
(II)  /∈ K  ¬( ∧ ).
We need to show that  /∈ K  ¬( ∧ ). Suppose for reductio that this is not true. Then  ∈ K  ¬( ∧ ) =
K  (¬∨ ¬∨ ¬) ∧ (¬∨ ¬). Then by (7) and (1) (¬∨ ¬) →  ∈ K  (¬∨ ¬∨ ¬), and by (1) again,
 ∈ K  (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬).
Now if  ∧  ∧ ¬ were not in K  (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬), then by (8) K  (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬) ⊆ K  (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬) ∧
(¬∨ ¬∨ ) = K  (¬∨ ¬), and hence  ∈ K  (¬∨ ¬). But this contradicts (II). Therefore we conclude that
 ∧  ∧ ¬ is in K  (¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬).
By (5u), we get that ¬∧ ∧  is not in K  (¬∨¬∨¬). So by (8), K  (¬∨¬∨¬) ⊆ K  (¬∨¬∨
¬) ∧ ( ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬) = K  (¬ ∨ ¬). Hence  ∧  ∧ ¬ ∈ K  (¬ ∨ ¬) and also  ∈ K  (¬ ∨ ¬). But this
contradicts (I).
So the supposition that  ∈ K  ¬( ∧ ) has led us to a contradiction. Thus  /∈ K  ¬( ∧ ) is true, and we have
shown that (E1) is satisﬁed.
For (E2), suppose that   . We need to show that  ≤ , i.e., that  /∈ K ¬(∧) or  ∈ K ⊥. By    and (6),
K  ¬( ∧ ) = K  ¬. Suppose that  ∈ K  ¬( ∧ ) = K  ¬. Then by (5u), ¬ /∈ K  ¬, i.e., K  ¬ is not
successful. But by (2c), this implies that K  ¬ = K  ⊥. So  ∈ K  ⊥, and by    and (1), we get  ∈ K  ⊥.
Thus (E2) is satisﬁed.
For (E3), suppose for reductio that neither  ≤  ∧  nor  ≤  ∧ . This means that both  ∈ K  ¬( ∧  ∧ ) =
K ¬(∧ ) and  ∈ K ¬(∧ ∧ ) = K ¬(∧ ) and that ∧  /∈ K ⊥. By (5u), we get that ¬(∧ ) /∈ K 
¬( ∧ ), i.e., K  ¬( ∧ ) is not successful. But by (2c), this implies that K  ¬( ∧ ) = K  ⊥, so  and  and
thus  ∧  are in K  ⊥, and we get a contradiction with our hypothesis. Therefore either  ≤  ∧  or  ≤  ∧  is
true, and (E3) is satisﬁed.
In the second step, we show that the entrenchment relation thus deﬁned actually generates the irrefutable revision
function. We distinguish two cases.
Case1: K ⊥ = K . Then, by (9), K   = K for arbitrary . The entrenchment relation ≤ deﬁned above reduces to
 ≤  iff  /∈ Kor  ∈ K.
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As the ﬁxed reference sentence, we choose ε = ⊥. Now let us take the retrieved entrenchment relation ≤ and deﬁne a
new revision function ′ by putting K ′  = K ◦ε  for all . This means, by (Def ◦ from ≤)
 ∈ K ′  iff
⎧⎨
⎩
¬ < ε ∧ ( → ) or
ε <  or
 ≤ ε ∧ ¬.
We have to show that ε = ⊥ and ≤ represent  in the sense that K   = K ′  = K ◦ε  for every . The deﬁnition
of ≤, together with the fact that K is consistent, yields that ⊥ ≤  for all  and ⊥ <  for all  ∈ K . Thus the above
reduces to
 ∈ K ′  iff ⊥ <  iff ⊥ /∈ K and  ∈ K.
Using again the fact that K is consistent, this means that K ′  = K = K   for all , as desired.
Case 2: K  ⊥ = K . Then, by (10), the set⋂ {K   :  ∈ K  } − K  ⊥ is non-empty. We pick an element ε
from this set and use it as the ﬁxed reference sentence for the rest of this proof.
Now we take this ε and the retrieved entrenchment relation ≤ and deﬁne a new revision function ′ by putting
K ′  = K ◦ε  for all . This means, by (Def ◦ from ≤)
 ∈ K ′  iff
⎧⎨
⎩
¬ < ε ∧ ( → ) or
ε <  or
 ≤ ε ∧ ¬
We have to show that the chosen ε and ≤ represent  in the sense that K   = K ′  = K ◦ε  for every .
Let us unravel the above by exploiting the meaning of ≤:
 ∈ K ′  iff
⎧⎨
⎩
ε ∧ ( → ) ∈ K  ¬(¬ ∧ (ε ∧ ( → ))) and ¬ /∈ K  ⊥ or
 ∈ K  ¬(ε ∧ ) and ε /∈ K  ⊥ or
 /∈ K  ¬( ∧ (ε ∧ ¬)) or ε ∧ ¬ ∈ K  ⊥.
But by the choice of ε, we know that ε /∈ K ⊥ is true, and, by (1), that ε ∧¬ ∈ K ⊥ is false. So the above reduces
to
 ∈ K ′  iff
{
ε ∧ ( → ) ∈ K  ( ∨ ¬ε) and ¬ /∈ K  ⊥ or
 ∈ K  (¬ε ∨ ¬).
Assume that  ∈ K ′ . We want to show that  ∈ K  . We look at the two cases in the reverse order.
Firstly, assume that  ∈ K (¬ε∨¬). We can infer that ε is not in K (¬ε∨¬), since if it were, then K (¬ε∨¬)
could not be successful, by (5u), hence K  (¬ε ∨¬) = K ⊥ by (2c), and so ε ∈ K ⊥, contradicting our choice
of ε. Since ε is not in K  (¬ε ∨ ¬), we conclude that K  (¬ε ∨ ¬) is not successful after all, by our choice of ε.
By (2c), then, K  (¬ε ∨ ¬) = K  ⊥. But then  is in K  ⊥, and thus it is in K  , too, by Lemma 5(ii).
Secondly, assume that ε∧( → ) ∈ K(∨¬ε). Since ε is in K(∨¬ε), we know that K(∨¬ε) is successful.
Hence ¬( ∨ ε) /∈ K  ( ∨ ¬ε), by (5u). Therefore, by (8), K  ( ∨ ¬ε) ⊆ K  (( ∨ ¬ε) ∧ ( ∨ ε)) = K  , by
(6). Now we know that all of ∨¬ε, ε and  →  are in K  (∨¬ε). Hence, by (1),  is in K  (∨¬ε), too. And
since K  ( ∨ ¬ε) ⊆ K  , we ﬁnally get that  is in K  , as desired.
We have now shown that whenever  is in K ′ , it also holds that  is in K  .
For the converse, suppose that  is in K  . Suppose further that  /∈ K  (¬ε ∨ ¬). By Lemma 5(ii), we conclude
that  is not in K  ⊥. We want to show that ε ∧ ( → ) ∈ K  ( ∨ ¬ε) and that ¬ /∈ K  ⊥.
Firstly, we conclude from  ∈ K   but  /∈ K  ⊥, that K   = K  ⊥ and K   is successful (use (2c)), i.e.,
 ∈ K . If ¬were in K ⊥, it would also be in K , by Lemma 5(ii), so K would be inconsistent, contradicting
(5u). So ¬ /∈ K  ⊥.
Secondly, we have that  ∈ K   = K  (( ∨ ¬ε) ∧ ) ⊆ (K  ( ∨ ¬ε)) + , by (6) and (7). So we get from
(1) that  →  is in K  (∨ ¬ε). It remains to show that ε is in K  (∨ ¬ε), too. Since K   is successful, we get,
Lemma 5(i), that K  ( ∨ ¬ε) is successful, too. But by our choice of ε, this means that ε is in K  ( ∨ ¬ε).
Thus K ′  = K   for all , as desired.
Finally, regarding iterations, the case is similar to irrevocable revisions: a comparative inspection of (it) and (IT1)
shows that (K  )   = (K ◦ε ) ◦ε  for all  and . 
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